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 Safety Management Systems (SMS) became a requirement for United 
States air carriers in March of 2015 when the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) established the requirements and codified them in the Code of Federal 
Regulations under Part 5 titled Safety Management Sytems (FAR, 2015). An 
organizational SMS, according to the FAA (2016a), should show a means of 
decision making, management capability before a system failure, risk controls 
through safety assurance, knowledge and data sharing with the FAA, and a sound 
safety culture. In the implementation and evaluation of an SMS, guidance for the 
understanding of a sound safety culture has shown to be a challenge. While there 
are many theories and studies on the development and assessment of safety culture, 
the FAA oversight and guidance on assessing safety culture was determined by the 
United States Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General 
(USDOT OIG) (2020) to be insufficient. 
Background 
 Before SMS was initially introduced by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and subsequently introduced to United States carriers by the 
FAA, aviation safety had gone through several iterations. Initially, the FAA had a 
dual focus of both safety and the economic protection of the industry. As the 
mechanical and technical issues of commercial flight were resolved, the industry 
moved initially to Crew Resource Management (CRM) to improve safety from the 
human factors perspective. CRM eventually evolved into the Threat and Error 
Management program used alongside Line Operation Safety Audits. However, 
those programs still have disconnects and occasionally fail to mitigate risks. This 
led to the introduction and eventual mandate of SMS (Petitt, 2017). 
 The ICAO (n.d.) created and released multiple editions of their Safety 
Management Manual, the most recent at the time of submission is the 4th edition, 
to provide guidance material to State and Regulatory bodies on safety management 
principles and concepts. The FAA (2016a) endorsed these principles and concepts 
by releasing their version of SMS with the goal of integrating modern risk 
management and safety assurance into the aviation industry. 
 Three regulatory ideas presented by the FAA (2014) seem to fall short of 
the intent of SMS implementation as determined by the USDOT OIG (2020) 
investigation. The FAA (2014) would continue to be responsible for the 
enforcement of regulation, would continue to be a technical workforce, and SMS 
implementation would not replace any FAA oversight. However, the USDOT OIG 
received complaints about the lack of FAA oversight counter to the message 
presented by the FAA. The findings by USDOT OIG may reinforce findings from 
Gill and Shergill (2004) where regulatory oversight was secondary in the role in 
aviation safety, behind luck. Surprisingly, even with the evolution of CRM and the 
introduction of SMS, ”…’pilots’ perceive luck and safety to be the most important 
factor in aviation safety” (Gill & Shergill, 2004, p. 237). While focused on aviation 
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in New Zealand, one of the major findings from this study is the perception that 
employers regard an individual’s responsibility for safety as more important than 
SMS or safety culture development. These perceptions are contrary to the stance 
taken by the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand where safety is an 
imperitave. One area of further study identified is the attitude of aviation safety 
being dependent on luck or if the attitude exists through lack of confidence in the 
SMS (Gill & Shergill, 2004).  
Statement of the Problem 
 The USDOT OIG (2020) received a hotline complaint about the oversight 
of a major U.S. airline SMS by the FAA in early 2018. One of the concerns 
identified by the USDOT OIG was the lack of appropriate guidance for FAA 
inspectors to assess safety culture as part of the oversight of SMS implementation. 
Through the USDOT OIG investigation into the airine and the FAA, the safety 
culture of said airline was identified as a concern, but the lack of guidance resulted 
in safety culture not being a factor in the evaluation of the airline’s risk 
identification and mitigation processes. Recent studies from academia showed the 
viability of quantitative and qualitative means to assess an organizational safety 
culture, however, it is unclear if the FAA will use the results of those studies to 
provide safety culture assessment guidance to inspectors at all levels. 
Research Question 
 What are the benefits, limitations, and assumptions of published 
quantitative and qualitative means of measuring an organizational safety culture 
and how could they be applied for the effective FAA oversight of SMS 
implementation by the aviation industry? 
Delimitations and Assumptions 
 A delimitation of this study was the restriction of sources to peer reviewed 
articles, FAA website pages, and the ICAO website pages inclusive of links 
provided by the FAA and ICAO to external sites. A second delimitation was the 
restriction of peer reviewed article searches that included the term “safety culture” 
in the search. A third delimitation was the restriction of using a case study from 
USDOT OIG (2020) findings to establish a scenario that focused on safety culture 
evaluation. 
 One assumption made in this study was the lack of bias in the USDOT OIG 
(2020) findings on the lack of FAA oversight for the the airline’s SMS 
implementation. A second assumption was that enough relevant peer reviewed 
studies had been published that investigated quantitative and qualitative means of 
measuring safety culture. A third assumption was that academic studies produced 
recommendations that could be implemented by the FAA and the Part 121 carriers 
without process or cost barriers that would make such implementation prohibitive.  
Methodology 
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 The method used in this study is a case study on the report from the DOT 
USOIG (2018) and the deficiencies identified by the USDOT OIG on the 
ineffective oversight of an airline’s SMS by the FAA. The research was conducted 
by searching for peer-reviewed articles relating to safety culture, SMS, and safety 
culture evaluation. The search terms for the peer-reviewed articles from were “SMS 
safety culture,” “safety culture,” “FAA safety culture,” “FAA SMS,” “measuring 
safety culture,” and “how does the FAA measure safety culture.” The sources were 
subjectively analyzed based on the article abstract and selected for inclusion based 
on applicability to the USDOT OIG recommendations, quantitative means of 
measuring organizational safety culture, qualitative means of measuring safety 
culture, and research into safety culture and climate. A case study was appropriate 
for this study as a real or quasi-experiment is not necessary given the amount of 
research conducted in this area. 
Literature Review 
 The Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SM ICG) is a 
collective of the regulatory bodies from Spain, Brazil, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, France, Italy, The European Aviation 
Safety Agency, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Japan, the FAA, Canada, the United 
Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdon. SM ICG (2019) published an evaluation 
tool to assist regulators and organizations to determine the state of their SMS. It is 
noted in the tool that it should not be used to develop a score for an SMS nor should 
the tool be used as pass/fail criteria in SMS implementation. This is a subjective 
tool with criteria that could require guidance to inspectors from each regulatory 
body in applying the guidelines of each section across different organizations (SM 
ICG, 2019). Narrowed to culture, the tool first labels culture as “safety culture,” 
then changes to “positive safety/just culture,” and eventually completely changes 
the label to “just culture” (SM ICG, 2019). The changing of the label for culture 
could impact the subjective evaluation. 
Safety Climate versus Safety Culture 
 Petitta et al. (2016) examined the understudied difference between safety 
climate and safety culture. Petitta et al. (2016) postulated that there was a lack of a 
clear theoretical difference between the two ideas in academia and industry. In 
defining safety climate, four factors stood out in the literature: the organization 
member’s perception of management concern for the safety of the employee, 
perception of opportunity to discuss safety issues, adequacy of safety training, and 
the quality of safety management systems, specifically their effectiveness in 
preventing work incidents. In comparison, safety culture is “a shared set of safety-
related attitudes, behaviors, values, and ingrained assumptions that orient 
organizational action pertaining to safety” (Petitta et al., 2016, p. 79). The 
difference between climate and culture was assumed to be individual versus group 
ideology, respectively, on the subject. 
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 Using a six factor confirmatory factor analysis model for the data collected 
from 32 Italian organizations, Petitta et al. (2016) had results consistent with prior 
research on safety climate and safety culture. Additionally, the findings indicated 
safety climate directly affected employee safety compliancewith safety climate 
noted as a construct that was distinct from safety culture. The limitations noted in 
the study was the use of convenince samples that could introduce self-selection bias 
as well as the use of cross-sectional self-reported data that could introduce common 
method bias with affects on the validity of the findings (Petitta et al., 2016). 
Safety Surveys 
 Gibbons et al. (2005) conducted a pilot study with a five factor safety survey 
for maintenance that was similar to a flight operations survey to develop a standard 
survey to assess organizational safety culture. Safety surveys are commonly used 
to assess safety climate and safety culture in an organization with mixed feelings 
about the effectivity of such surveys from individuals in the industry. The study 
was limited to two Part 121 airlines with a response rate of 13% and 26% for a total 
of 185 returned surveys. For the overall model fit that was studied, the single factor 
model and the five factor model had poor model fit. However, Gibbons et al. (2005) 
did find that two of the five factors they investigated were problematic in the 
survey. The revised complete model still did not show a good fit with the two 
factors of organizational commitment and employee empowerment. The 
conclusion was that those two factors may require further consideration due to the 
complexity uncovered when analyzing the survey data. The concerted effort on the 
part of Gibbons et al. (2005) to develop a viable survey demonstrated the 
difficulties in using surveys to analyze safety culture in an organization. 
 While the FAA supported the study by Gibbons et al. (2005) with a funding 
award, the FAA (2016b) provides a link to the Government of Canada (2015) safety 
culture survey that is based on the James Reason’s Checklist for Assessing 
Institutional Resilience. This survey developed a numerical score that enabled a 
quick assessment from the management level on the safety culture of the 
organization. However, this safety culture survey is limited by the focus on 
management commitment, competence and cognizance (Government of Canada, 
2015). 
Qualitative Analysis 
 Robertson (2016) conducted a qualitative analysis of perceptions of safety 
professionals with regard to SMS and safety culture in flight training organizations. 
Of those organizations, only two of the five organizations involved in the study had 
mature SMS. It was noted that while three of the organizations utilized surveys to 
gather safety data, two of the organizations used Line Operations Safety 
Assessments, audits, observations, and flight data management to evaluate safety 
culture. Cultural change was noted for organizations that reported commitment 
from accountable executives as well as stakeholder involvement when benefits 
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from cultural assessments and independed hazard reporting were realized. The 
development and building of a strong SMS was noted to come from an already 
existent strong safety culture (Robertson, 2016). 
 Robertson (2016) noted a limitation in the study because of the small, 
purposeful sample size from the University Aviation Association safety 
professionals. Further, the study was based in phenomenology and was identified 
as not being generalizable to a greater population. The recommendations from the 
study was to continue qualitative and quantitative research into the relationship 
between safety culture and SMS (Robertson, 2016). 
Quantitative Analysis 
 Stolzer et al. (2018) researched a model using data envelopment analysis to 
test a survey intended to measure the effectiveness of an SMS. The survey 
instrument developed was determined to have a high level of convergent validity 
and was determined to be reliable. The discriminate validity was unable to be 
confirmed because of insufficient evidence. Stolzer et al. (2018) made mention that 
there was no clear path for evaluating an SMS, but the model developed may be 
able to be used by the aviation industry to evaluate their own implemented SMS 
programs.  
 The model developed in this study was intended for use only by aviation 
service providers and would not be an appropriate tool for other aviation operations. 
With the responses to the survey being anonymous by not collecting personally 
identifiable information, the assumption made of the collected data was that all 
answers were truthful. The study was funded by the FAA through a research grant 
and recommended further refinement of the survey questions along with running 
the models again with more data for the goal of developing an industry tool (Stolzer, 
2018). 
 Wei et al. (2020) countered the position of Stolzer et al. (2018) of survey 
usage with their study of 82 different enterprises in 11 separate industries and found 
that surveys have little effect on the safety culture of an organization. Their results 
mirrored a study conducted by Stewart (2002), also referenced in their study, during 
his tenure at DuPont that indicated safety culture is representative of the safety 
climate. Essentially, the higher safety performing organizations had a greater 
number of individuals who had a greater understanding of safety performance in 
common while the poor performing organizations had a greater number of 
employees with a poor understanding of safety performance (Wei et al., 2020).  
 Of note, the majority of enterprises included in the study were based in coal 
production and limited the ability of Wei et al. (2020) to make any industry 
comparisons. However, the conclusions were consistent with the findings of 
Stewart (2002), but were identified as not being generalizable to the overall safety 
culture of China due to the small sample of organizations in relation to the full range 
of Chinese enterprises. 
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For Profit Evaluators 
 Commercially available safety culture tools are available from for-profit 
organizations and were investigated by van Nunen et al. (2018) specific to the 
Belgian market to examine the extent with which the studied tools were based in 
scientific evidence. Of the 68 tools found through internet searches, 15 tools were 
included based on seven inclusion criteria that focused on organizational or 
behavioral aspects and appropriateness to occupational safety and health 
legislation. With the 15 tools not being freely available, van Nunen et al. (2018) 
contacted each company and received agreeable responses from eight companies. 
Through the evaluation of the selected tools, subjective expert opinion was the 
focus of each tool with many having a basis in scientific frameworks. However, 
none of the tools studied were validated through scientific evidence, the relative 
importance of the tools to accident rates was unknown, and the internal validity of 
the tools were not known. A recurrent theme of theory not put into practice and 
practice not being put into theory was reiterated in the conclusion. The 
recommendation was for the commercial organizations and academia to work 
together to close the tool validation gap. 
Discussion 
 Measuring organizational safety culture is benefited through the amount of 
peer reviewed articles published that have used quantitative and qualitative means 
of measuring and assessing organizational safety culture. While there are 
differences in the means of measuring, the understanding of safety climate and 
safety culture, to include the difference in definition, seems to be agreed upon by 
most researchers. This provides a strong framework for commercial enterprises to 
develop tools used to evaluate safety culture in organizations subject to State 
regulation. This knowledge could be used by the FAA to develop and implement 
guidance for inspectors to address a recommendation from the USDOT OIG 
(2020). 
There are limitations to the published studies. Many of the studies identified 
concerns with results that may have caused the researchers to recommend further 
study. Additionally, reseachers often made note of generalizability based on the 
sample size or population that could have an affect on the results. This limitation 
could result in tools that are specific to an industry or organization and may not be 
a one-size tool for the general aviation industry. Limitations from published 
scientific works should not be considered a negative for the FAA. Instead, the 
limitations found through research could help define the constraints of a developed 
tool or constrain the methodology used based on industry or culture. 
The most commonly mentioned assumption, based on most of the studies 
using surveys to collect data, was that the survey participants were telling the truth. 
While the researchers took steps to help protect participant anonyminity, violation 
of this assumption by participants could change the results. This assumption, and 
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the resultant tailoring of surveys to mitigate a risk of participants providing untrue 
responses, could be used by the FAA to limit the amount of demographic data 
collected to mitigate the same risk in industry tool usage. 
Conclusion 
 Addressing the USDOT OIG (2020) recommendation on providing 
guidance on safety culture evaluation could be a difficult task. While commercially 
available tools exist, they seem to lack internal validity even being based on 
previous scientific frameworks. While academia has produced validated means to 
assess the collected data, concerns with some results seems to create more 
recommendations for study. For the FAA, funding and facilitiation of cooperation 
between commercial industry and academia could be the path towards addressing 
a gap in oversight identified by the USDOT OIG. 
Recommendations 
 One recommendation is based on the findings of van Nunen et al. (2018) 
where funded research into safety culture evaluation methods lead to the 
publication of tools. Two published studies included in this work were funded by 
the FAA, with one study showing promise of a scientifically validated tool, but the 
theory is not put into practice. The FAA (2016b) website links to aforementioned 
survey posted by the Government of Canada (2015). The recommendation is for 
the FAA to continue to fund, develop, and release scientifically validated tools for 
safety culture evaluation. 
 A second recommendation is for academia to look for opportunities to work 
with commercial organizations that provide unvalidated safety tools to industry. By 
looking for and exploiting partnering opportunities, academia and private industry 
can work towards closing the gap between theory not becoming practice and 
practice not becoming theory. 
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